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Editor\u2019s note: This article is adapted from a 4 January<\/a>\u00a0post on\u00a0<\/em>FYI, which reports on federal science policy. Both\u00a0<\/em>FYI\u00a0and\u00a0<\/em>Physics Today\u00a0are published by the American Institute of Physics.<\/em><\/p>\n New guidance from the White House aims to standardize implementation of research security policies across federal science agencies, including the categories of information that scientists will be required to report when applying for grants. Released on 4 January, the document<\/a> clarifies science agencies\u2019 responsibilities in adhering to\u00a0National Security Presidential Memorandum 33<\/a>\u00a0(NSPM-33), which sets minimum requirements for research security across the government. NSPM-33 was\u00a0issued<\/a>\u00a0by the Trump administration during its final week, and so far the Biden administration has chosen not to modify it, opting instead to shape how the policy is applied.<\/p>\n The new guidance document aims to address continued confusion over what information federally funded researchers must disclose to the government pursuant to NSPM-33, and to address concerns about the administrative burdens of disclosure and the potential for unfair enforcement. Such matters have taken on high stakes, particularly as the Department of Justice has prosecuted more than a dozen academic scientists for allegedly concealing their ties to institutions in China. Two weeks ago, the government secured a\u00a0guilty verdict\u00a0against a prominent chemistry professor, Charles Lieber.<\/p>\n The guidance document does not address criminal justice matters, focusing instead on the standardization of disclosure requirements and enforcement by science agencies. It also promotes the use of digital persistent identifiers to simplify disclosure and outlines protocols for sharing information across agencies concerning known and suspected violators.<\/p>\n An interagency panel dedicated to research security has been working on the guidance document since August. In setting out its task, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy director Eric Lander instructed<\/a>\u00a0it to craft disclosure requirements that protect against threats posed by researchers\u2019 connections to certain foreign governments while also ensuring that such policies do not stoke discrimination and xenophobia.<\/p>\n The guidance document acknowledges that tension. It states that agency policies must be implemented in a nondiscriminatory manner and should be \u201crisk-based,\u201d offering \u201ctangible benefit that justifies any accompanying cost or burden.\u201d<\/p>\n At the same time, the document stresses, \u201cThere have been efforts to induce American scientists to secretively conduct research programs on behalf of foreign governments or to inappropriately disclose non-public results from research funded by U.S. government sources.\u201d It specifically identifies the governments of China, Russia, and Iran as examples of entities that are \u201cworking vigorously .\u00a0.\u00a0. to acquire, through both licit and illicit means, U.S. research and technology.\u201d<\/p>\n Notably, the document does not offer specific guidance on what kinds of institutional connections should be considered unacceptable or on how agencies should act on the information disclosed to them. In a foreword to the document, Lander explains:<\/p>\n While current efforts on NSPM-33 seek to clarify and simplify how researchers disclose information to the federal government, they do not address other key questions about NSPM-33 implementation\u2014namely, how the government uses this information in making decisions about research funding and support. Such questions are equally important, and OSTP intends to address them in the future.<\/p>\n Where the government has legitimate concerns about a potential conflict of interest or conflict of commitment, we have a responsibility to be clear and open about what our concerns are and why. It is important to avoid undue, vague, and implicit pressures on researchers, as this could create a chilling atmosphere that would only constrain and damage the U.S. scientific enterprise.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n An OSTP official tells FYI that the interagency research security panel will likely develop guidance this year on appropriate uses of disclosed information.<\/p>\n Many science agencies began revising their disclosure requirements even before the release of NSPM-33 in response to concerns raised by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Congress also\u00a0mandated\u00a0that science agencies develop uniform disclosure policies through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.<\/p>\n The new guidance aims to ensure that requirements are generally consistent across agencies and simple to comply with. As a next step, it states that federal agencies will produce model grant application forms within 120 days.<\/p>\n Outlining what types of information will be collected and on what forms, the guidance includes a\u00a0detailed table<\/a>\u00a0indicating the kinds of organizational affiliations, monetary support, and \u201cin-kind\u201d support that must be disclosed. The table resembles ones already produced by the\u00a0National Institutes of Health<\/a>\u00a0and NSF<\/a>.<\/p>\n The guidance reiterates that NSPM-33\u2019s disclosure requirements are intended to apply to principal investigators and \u201cother senior\/key personnel\u201d on federal grants, as well as agency program officers, researchers at federal labs, peer reviewers, and federal advisory committee members. It also states that students should generally be exempt from making disclosures to science agencies.<\/p>\n The exact disclosure requirements vary according to the nature of the role of the person in question. However, consistent with federal concern over \u201cforeign government-sponsored talent recruitment programs,\u201d participation in such programs must be universally disclosed for all roles. In addition, upon request, personnel must produce contracts they have entered into with foreign entities, and agencies may choose to require that such contracts be submitted as part of the standard application process.<\/p>\n Addressing potential variations among agency disclosure requirements, the guidance document states they \u201cshould be limited to cases (a) where required by statute or regulation; (b) where more stringent protections are necessary for protection of R&D that is classified, export-controlled, or otherwise legally protected; or (c) for other compelling reasons consistent with individual agency authorities.\u201d Such exceptions could cover, for instance, the\u00a0risk management framework<\/a>\u00a0the Department of Energy has already developed to subject certain projects to greater scrutiny if they involve collaboration with countries of concern.<\/p>\n The guidance document reiterates that disclosure policy violations can warrant a range of consequences, including criminal and civil penalties as well as administrative actions such as rejecting an application, dropping personnel from a grant, and barring personnel or entire organizations from receiving future funding. It states that agencies\u2019 inspectors general should investigate possible violations and refer cases to appropriate offices at DOJ \u201cwhen warranted.\u201d<\/p>\n Citing the need to preserve \u201can appropriate level of flexibility for agencies and research organizations,\u201d the document does not set specific guidelines covering what sorts of consequences are appropriate for what sorts of violations. Instead it lists factors agencies may consider when deciding their course of action. Those include the \u201charm or potential harm\u201d caused by the violation, the researcher\u2019s knowledge of the requirements, whether it is an isolated incident or part of a pattern of violations, and whether the researcher was forthcoming in correcting omissions and mistakes.<\/p>\n The document also states, \u201cAgencies should strongly encourage self-disclosure and correction of omissions and inaccuracies, including by ensuring that self-disclosure will be taken into consideration during the process of administrative resolution of noncompliance with disclosure requirements.\u201d Researchers and their employers are also to be given the opportunity to contest proposed punitive actions.<\/p>\n The document further notes that the interagency research security panel will develop a \u201cstandard operating procedure template\u201d that will offer further guidance on agency roles and responsibilities for addressing disclosure violations.<\/p>\n In addressing the issue of disclosure, Lander has since the beginning of his time in the White House\u00a0endorsed<\/a>\u00a0the idea of implementing an \u201celectronic CV\u201d system that enables researchers to easily update their information in a single location so that it can be accessed across science agencies. To implement that idea, the guidance document promotes the use of \u201cdigital persistent identifiers,\u201d or DPIs. Many researchers already use DPIs such as the\u00a0Open Researcher and Contributor ID<\/a>\u00a0(ORCID)\u00a0to attach their identity to work published across different digital platforms.<\/p>\n The document states that all science agencies \u201cshould provide the option of using a DPI service for disclosure,\u201d though it adds that they may retain the option for grant applications to be processed without an identifier. It also states that agencies should use private-sector DPI services \u201cto the greatest extent possible\u201d and make sure they are available \u201cat no cost to the researcher.\u201d<\/p>\n The document encourages creators of DPI services to design tools that account for the types of information agencies will require researchers to disclose. \u201cFrom our perspective, we are not looking to favor one solution over another; we simply want all such solutions to meet the needs of both researchers and agencies,\u201d it states.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\nGuidance aims to balance threat response and bias concerns<\/h4>\n
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Model grant forms to be developed within 120 days<\/h4>\n
Guidance encourages correction of disclosure mistakes<\/h4>\n
Digital identifiers viewed as key tool to ease compliance burdens<\/h4>\n